>> now, a conversation about japanese foreign policy. we'll hear about japanese attitudes towards the u.s. and china since the end of world war ii in a conference at george washington university, this is just under an hour. >> please return to your seats as soon as possible. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> all right, we now move on to the japan session, and i'm really pleased to be able to introduce the chair for the defense session, michael schipper joining us from the

secretary of defense. we got, you know, a number of people from the government here, very, very busy people and the fact they are joining us, i'll assume they think our project is really, really important, and they didn't want to miss this. [laughter] his full bio is in the folder that you've got, but he came to his present job from the stanley foundation where he was running the policy analysis and dialogue and the asia programs in the foundation. i remember that stanley foundation was one of the first i believe to look at this idea of rising powers and try to write about that, and i was very useful, so i think it's particularly relevant that he could join us today. he's also been a fellow at the com on foreign relations. he's also work in the u.s.

senate with diane feinstein, and he has also worked at the nyu center for war, peace, news, and media. he's done a lot of things. he's also has a number of pursuits, including something about a bed and breakfast running, so anyway, he has a lot of wealth of experience at the table today, so, michael, i'll turn it to you, and just a word of caution to anybody up here, apparently we're not supposed to shut the computer under any circumstance because it sets off something in the technology, and we won't be able to get the slides back up, so just a wore of caution. thank you. >> well, thank you very much. >> sorry, one more thing. the show is on cnn srb -- sorry, c-span. >> the incentive for me in that

is? [laughter] >> [inaudible] >> yeah, that's never a good place to be. [laughter] >> i should move over there. it's always lots of downside and upside in these sorts of opportunities. in any case, my thank you for asking me to join you this morning. this is a sort of conversation and discussion that we don't have the opportunity engage in as often as we ought to in the policy community, and for those of us as david and i were talking about before, the like -- we don't want to make a hat of it, but make policy decisions based on some information -- [laughter] and analysis, being able to spend a few minutes with you all this morning and try to build much needed capital is

extraordinarily valuable. thanks for doing this and my thanks for inviting me to come along for the ride. we'll try to make up for time our colleagues on the china panel have stolen from us, but that's -- that's a feeling that i think those of us that work japan are increasingly used to. [laughter] in any case, i'll offer my way of some very brief introduction that, you know, one of the things that is really impressed itself on me over the past couple of years while at the department of defense is the -- not sure i would say primacy, but the real weight political domestic debates have in driving foreign policy decision making. that's here in the united states, but also obviously in china and japan, and carerra and other countries -- korea and other countries in asia as well. in many significant ways, i

would offer there's no better example of the role that domestic political factors and domestic political debates can have in shaping foreign policy and national security making than in japan. that's not just function i should underscore of the past couple years under the dpj or even a question of having to do what letter a couple of thousands of meters get -- of concrete gets poured in. it has to do with bigger issues like culture, bureaucratic politics, the influence of individual policymakers and the fact that electoral politics have in japanese foreign policy decision making as japan feels its way towards a genuine two-party or multiparty political system, so i think the

discussion that we have lined up for this morning should be very, very interesting and worthwhile, and i would offer that from my personal perspective, the main incentive for drawing me here is the opportunity to unvail myself of the wisdom and insight of three people with richie and sheila whose wisdom i seek and so my purpose as chair will be to sit at the end of the table and taking notes furiously and copiously as they offer their thoughts, so with that, i'll turn things over to duke and mitch for their presentation and she'll ya for -- sheila for her comments to follow. thank you. >> thanks very much, mike, and great to be here. i want to thank henry and deepa, and g-dub for organizing this

process and to be engaged in ways that we're delighted to report out to you. there is -- can you hear in the back now because you were having trouble earlier. it's okay? yeah, it may seem odd. it struck me it may seem odd to some folks that we're including japan on a project on rising powers. i mean, this is not the 1920s. [laughter] it's -- last time i checked. [laughter] it's not the 1980s when we were all agoing on japan becoming a rising power. potentially japan is a great power. it has many of the pieces to be a great power again, and, of course, after the catastrophes of 3-11, there's the possibility

that japan may be reborn yet again or at least reup vented yet again so it deserved closer analysis. that said i start with an apology that the paper was written before, for the most part, before 3/11 and we'll have to reincorporate and hopefully other comments get at what 3/11 may mean for a reborn, revitalized japan or not. what we've done here is write about what we call hugging and hedging, and while this chart here is not in the paper, it is from a book that i did a few years ago, and there's no examine. [laughter] you're not going to be quizzed on this. i know you're happy, but there's a point to the chart to say that debates about japanese national

strategy, grand strategy, national security are not new. they are not unique to the 21st century or the 20th century, but it's been around for a long time, and, in fact, importantly i think, in fact, connect over time, and i'm not going to spend a lot of time on this just to say that there were in the past three moments of real consensus on what japanese national strategy should be, consensus on getting rich and being strong, the rich nation strong army consensus of the late 19th, early 20th century, that led to the forced march, rationalized the force to industrialization. that was very successful. the second being after a time of real debate and real discord as well as discourse between lib calls and mill -- military here, a moment of great

consensus, the central, japan, the greater east asia sphere consensus that led to the destruction of much of asia ale really all of -- all of japan that broke out into another debate that was rectified in a sense through the dominant grand strategy of japan that still a more or less in place to a matter of some debate which is the idea of cheap riding on american security guarantees, and being basically mercantile realist strategy and heading towards what is still a question mark for us and myself. the way we map this discourse, and this is what i think david was referring to in his kind remarks in the first session that there are two ax us on

which the debates proceed, one is the horizontal axis which is a proxy101, that if you get too close with your partner, you can get entangled in their wars, but if too distant, you're ire relevant, ignored, and therefore unprotected in your alliance, so this question about how close you hug versus how much distance you put from the united states has been a central element in japan's security discourse for a very, very long time. the vertical dimension has to do with the extent to which japan -- the statute of limitations for japan's bad behavior in the middle part of the last century that expired or not and could they use force as a mean of settling international disputes and revise its constitution and allow for this? as some of you know my work, i've been arguing japan is

slowly by deliberately slicing at the challenge -- salaami slicing doesn't sound elegant, but it's what's going on. [laughter] it create four spaces for the debate. the pass vis, each one has a different view of what japan should be and where it should be and what its identity should be, one views japan should seek peace, others prosperity, that's mostly the doctrine, seeking equality with the alliance partners and those who say, you know, it's time to do it ourselves, seek sovereignty. this debate is joined. it's remitted in institution --

represented and joined in institutions in ways that we try to get at in the paper as well, but what's interesting about this array of views we think is that there's been a lot of movement so if you believe that the doctrine -- doctrine-aires? where they are called the mercantile realist, if they have this through an agreement with the pass vieses to not just hug the united states, but hug article ix of the institution, they gave way to the consolidation of power within their own party to revisionists that represented most recently by the prime minister and his allies within the party, so i have here recent ldp government

had consolidated power embraced the notion of normal nationalism saying, look, it is time to be normal and to be normal for some in a very tony blare like way. -- blair way. this is one way to submit a way to be normal. indian style is a way to be normal, and the canadian and germans thought about normality than the united states in recent adventures, so we have variations. the point is in september -- or a point is in september of 2009 in the late summer when the dpj took power with unprecedented majority, a supermajority in the national diet, there was a shift. it was the beginning of a shift that mike schiffer eluded to.

domestic politics masker. the posture of the thinking and the discourse had changed. the first -- the dpj one i refer to the administration which thanks in part to the misbehavior of the north koreans, you can count on them, but also to what david and mike were talking about, the sort of surprising assertiveness of the chinese in the spring of last year and in the fall of last year. the -- the government gave way to a kaun government more amendable to the status quo, not completely, but more willing to hug the united states, and so efforts that had been made to reduce host nation supports were abandoned and so forth. there's a long list. it's in the paper, and i hope you have a look at it. but what we thought would be

particularly important is to change this, this array slightly. it seemed to us that it would be useful to redimension the debate in china that somehow finding the right distance not just from the united states, but finding the right distance from china was something that was the most important strategic choice facing japan today. getting it right not just with the united states, but with china as well was -- would require military and both economic readjustments we tried to get it. we redimensioned the debate a little bit in the last third of the paper, and given the relative power shift taking place between the united states and china, the main taping the distance with the united states -- maintaining the distance with the united states while closing it with china seems to make

grand strategic sense for japan. these policies and efforts as we've already seen have not been well coordinated however. most u.s. and japanese policymakers, the io license managers continue to appreciate and elevate the importance of the bilat railing aliensz -- bilateral alliance when china is assertive, and that alliance drift was halted, and then again after the 3/11 crisis, is looks like the relationship was further reenforced, and the jury is still out on what all of 3/11 means, and i'll spend the next year trying to understand that while i'm in japan. still, this too creates four spaces in a very active national security discourse. i'll just flick at each one, and then i'll stop, but this -- these structural contradictions of the policies are reflected here in a revised model. some are familiar to us.

for example, if we look at the southwest again as in the original model, there are those who distrust foreign entanglements, not just on the right, but the left as well and prefer a japan that requires and sustains an independent military capability or on the far left, no military capability at all. they see no reason to hedge their bits on the rise of china or on the decline relative decline of the united states, so in their view, japan should regain full sovereignty and provide for itself in a self-help world. we talk about internal balancing. this group included pass pass vieses and the oppression of atonmy is independent to a preference of the use of force. that's why we readjusted the model. second, there are those who in

the northwest here who advocate a china-japan economic continue min yum and prefer band wagoning economically with the chinese. they want to discount china as a military threat an emphasize the benefits from a robust bilateral economic relationship. the main risk they face is, of course, betrayal by china, but they discount that. they imagine that china will be generally a responsible stake holder and regional state, and they don't want to miss the china bus. one hears that often. third is the balancers in the southeast. they are more atentive to military threats from beijing much less enamored with the economic benefits from china, and if they would hitch by integrating with china economically, those who would balance china would hedge by

balancing with -- with hedge militarily maintaining the robust relationship with the united states in the belief that china is going to be more assertive and that that -- through the assertions should be meant with detainment or deterrence through an expanded network of alert states, australia, india, the united states in collaboration. finally, then i will stop, is this group we call integrators in the upper right hand, the northeast. these are folks who believe that japan and really should have it both ways, that -- in their view better economic relations with beijing ought not or need not be purchased at the price of diminished relations with the united states, so they would pursue a dual hedge protecting japan from economic predation by integrated with the chinese economically protecting japan from chinese coercion by

maintaining a healthy alliance with the united states. they are confident china's rise can be peaceful and they do fear china's betrayal and that u.s. decline -- they fear the betrayal and u.s. decline in equal issue is the way to think about this. we argue that the ideas matter at the end of the day, but take time at the end of the paper to explane how struck we've been by how ideas about japan's grand strategy do vary and how domestic politics affected the choices in structural context in the context of asia where things change and policy responds. thank you very much. >> thank you very much. i was paused when dick speaks because i'm digesting when he finishes speaking. thank you for inviting me to the

conversation. it's a tremendously important project. most of my background is on japanese politics and foreign policy, so i come from the other direction inside japan looking out, but i do want to emphasize it two of the appointments stated so clearly, and that is japan is at a moment of change whether you look at japan's vision outwards or the way in which policies are determined internally. this is a very important moment to continue to look at japan in the choices it makes, and that has not only implications for the region and the globe, but also for our relationship with japan. it is a terrific paper. the paper i've been asked to discuss on japan by dick, two people i've read and talked to over the years, and so many times i feel like i have internalized so much of what they say it's hard to say anything that opposes it. two things i think are important about the schools of thought

approach to japan and the kind of work that both of them have been engaged in for some time, and that is often sitting here in washington assumes japan doesn't have strategic thinking and there's not a contest of ideas inside japan leading to the choices japan makes particularly in its relationship with us, so again in kind of work is integral to understanding that japan has made choices, strategic choices over time and particularly in its relationship with us. i think from here on out, japan made strategic choices clearly with china and other neighbors, but i think the call calculus and recoal abrasion that the barren gets at is -- recollaboration that the paper gets at requires reinstitutional organization and will be contested domestically, the electoral piece of this going forward will be very fascinating

to watch. in the china session i couldn't help but note two words used, "red lines" and "silences," and it's important in japan as well to note throughout the last half century that japan debated its choices, significant slainses and significant red lines, and we all know about the tabooings in article 9 and as we watch politicians engage in greater strategic discor in the public domain, 70s on forward, it is very much because some of the red lines and some of the silences have diminished in japan, so what you're getting and for some of us it's a good healthy debate about the range of options, but there's still underneath it all some very deep concerns about these red lines and silences and whether or not it's acceptable for post war

japan to debate a nuclear operation; right? or an atonmy ending the u.s. security treaty for example. these are difficult to talk in some ways about japan. there is potential for japan looking forward to alter its worship with us, to fundamentally challenge the ways in which it is a second order change, the ways in which japan has cooperated with us, and i think you certainly see that in the base issue. you see it in the conversation that's a little quieter than selma, but extend the the conversation and heard in the first year of the government, but it also fundamentally offers for japanese strategic thinkers new opportunities. this goes back to the comment in the china section which is remember the gaze starts in tokyo and looks out with issues relevant to the united states, but sitting in tokyo listening

to the conversation that gauges looking out predominantly in the northeast asian direction opposed to over here at the moment because of the changes in that region, but a many people will argue there's opportunities to articulate a national strategy that has been very difficult to talk about so far one in the military interest of japan that becomes my divergent, but it's a time to recalibrate and bopped perhaps -- abandon policies not successful or no longer appropriate to japan today, and that's the self-limitations imposed by our alliance or could be in fact the cooperation, the kinds of cooperations that japan pursued with its ally, us. i have five basic sets of question that just occurred in my mind when i read the paper, and these are not critiques not much as my own brain coming at this in a different way while

reading so i thought i'd offer it up. when you talk about, particularly in the last third of the paper which is so valuable in looking at u.s.-china in where the schools of thoughts come out on u.s. and china, i couldn't help but say if you're in tokyo and having this conversation with others, the terms of the strategic bargain, ie, the alliance with the united states was set, and they were set at the end of world war ii, i'm going in the direction of a nuclear era, and a new strategic context in which a deterrent required different abilities and the japanese were willing to develop. i'm not sure there's a lot of rethinking about that type of strategic context, not what about united states or china but what should japan do, acquire, organize itself to acquire that

would allow japan to have an aton mist capacity to defend itself, and at the end of world war ii, this was the beginning of a nuclear era, a whole new world, and japan was not prepared to go this way for all reasons this group is familiar with, but that was the hug, the beginning of the bargain with the united states and i think every since then for the last half century, many in japan, left, right, and many in the paper laid out nice us resisted, got uncomfortable with, tried to reorganize, but i think that hug is a slightly different hug than just a choice of strategic partner here and it's worth remembering that. second point on the schools of thought and a longer range on post-war japan, but there's earlier work on this and the mercantile work is important and understand it completely, but i bridle at the idea that he himself may have been a mother

-- mercantilist, but this says something about a post-3/11 as well. that early period of 52-55 was fertile in political contestation. there was different debates, choices about what options japan had, and what resulted was the doctrine that we now articulate and dick's paper does so nicely here, but it was a reconstruction ere -- era, and here we are in a moment of japan rethinking and have that reconstruction moment again. it matters to me when i look at the schools of thought why the ideas came and why it matters and strengthen and weaken over time and part of the question again for the project beyond japan perhaps is when looking at the introduction of new policies and new strategic choices, how do yo determine what continuity and what's change?

how do you determine what's in the atommy, has been there aalong in the debate versus what is really signifying that the agency of change has changed? whether it's institutions or the individual decision makers, when do you recognize that he was somebody fundamentally different or a blip on the screen over time? the second piece of this question, of course, is the dpj. now, has a new school of thought arisen? has the, you know, what we would like to call the liberal -- the engagers, the globalists, have they arrived to japan to lead the japanese strategic thinking review process to alter japan's choices? i don't think we have an answer yesterday. you watch the cam pape, watch reactions here in -- campaign and watch reactions here in washington, but it's too early. they have not been in power long enough for us to know, but it's the new school of thought arriving in mower that i think energized our japan conversation

about these new voices. i suspect, if we meet five or ten years from now, they will look like the ldp, and i don't mean that in the normal preampses, but the ruling will shape their understanding of what their latitude for choice is 6789 i have to hurry because i'm running out of time. my third point, how do you allow for new conceptions? in here, and again, this is the japan paper specifically. 1970s, you have the -- at least the portended end of the cold war. the idea that japan can at last articulate what is a natural japanese preamps, comprehensive security, looking at energy resources, food security, devising means to follow japanese interests. taking issue on the united states in middle east policy, for example; right? you see japan moving in a set of choices than it had been able to in the past. new conception?

new school of thought? just new latitude to make different choices? i think the same thing could be going on or see the northeast asian community concept very similarly. okay, this is a moment where northeast asia is more receptive to japan being in the reclusive building, the summit is in my mind, but they began it and so there's a middle ground now in the japanese thinking, but that doesn't really fall down ideological lines, but really is attend dent to the transformation and the ambitions japan is central to the process but had been limited in the past. i'm going to say, you know, the bread being sliced, you know, i think what i -- sense all of us

watching japan are grappling with this is is there a new loaf of bread being baked? the question is in my mind, are we seeing new ideas that really fundamentally challenge schools of thought there before? the atonomy has always been there, just not a pragmatic agenda. there's two categories for me, but maybe there's something new. how elastic is it going to be? where is it coming from? i haven't heard anything yet, and hopefully you'll disagree with me that suggests we've moved out of the four schools of thought in japan. the agents have shifted. my final point is, and i'm sorry because i'm not answering your question about 3/11 and the

aftermath, but so much of japan and our scholarship on japan intended to interpret the domestic preferences here, post war ideology, the access of where you stand on that article 9 and stand on reconciliation of china and where you stand on the relationship with the united states has to do with japan's thinking of the first half of the 21st century and internalized that experience, and i'll call it experience not to the offensive, but one of the pieces so challenging for me, and i'm doing this project that dick's going to help me with, i hope, is how does policy interpret, learn, use experiences of past mistakes, and who learns the lessons and how does that affect the way these schools of thought are generated? world war ii was a miscalculation by almost every school of thought whether anybody else.

that trajectory for japan did not turn out well; right? i find very few people in my interviews who tell me they should go back and try again on that; right? that -- that set of choices has now been taken away, so your parameters have shifted. negotiating with the united states in the post-war period, there is also a learning that's gone on there, not necessarily always in our favor, but again you see it in the basis issue, stepping back, allowing certain kinds of latitude on the basis has not been healthy inside japan and which is why you have much more public sensitivities today. again, i think you'll find the dpj is learning on what works and doesn't works also affects how the different ideas within the party mesh in a strategic set of parameters for that party as well. thank you very much. >> well, thank you all very much as well. i think we have about 20 minutes for questions and discussion --

okay. my apology. let me let you respond. >> thank you very much. i'll try to answer here questions as much as possible and then refer it to dick. before i do so, let me thank the organizers to for including japan as one of the rising powers, and those i'd like to thank american people, the government, and the department of defense, u.s. forces in japan for providing really important support in the time of our need, and i would like to have people here, in this floor and in the u.s. to come visit japan. this is a difficult time for us, but it'd be nice if we can see a lot of friends. coming to visit us. tokyo is safe fortunately.

i just came from tokyo, and so place come, you know, keep visiting japan, and if you are -- this is a great time to investigate what's going on if you're a reporter. [laughter] let me answer some of the questions posed. first one is deterrence and i think we have been doing several things to think really more deeply about how we shape our deterrent capability. one is that the fact we people, particularly the minister of foreign affairs has started really talking to the american partners to discuss the nature and credibility of extended deterrence, and for this, our government officials came to washington in late 2008, and some of them coming from the

japanese embassy here, and early 2009 and they talked to the american cawrpt -- counterparts about what we want to see in the u.s. defense policy and basically three important messages. well, first one our people said told the american friends that, you know, they made a statement that the usable penetrating nuclear weapons might spread the ability of extended nuclear deterrence. they didn't say we'd like to see it happen. second, we, you know, asked u.s. government to con summit with us -- consult with us in advance in case the u.s. decides to decommission nuclear missiles and u.s. government did decommission later on, and the

third, we asked u.s. government to reveal or provide more information to us on nuclear war plans and the nuclear posture that the united states main tapes. those are the three. this is new. it's amazing how long we have been talking about, you know, nuclear em brel la, nuclear deterrence without really seriously discussing what's in that content of that nuclear umbrella, but we have started to do so, so that was an advance, but, you know, we have been backtracking since then about what i said, you know, happened under ldp, liberal democratic party rule, and when the administration came into office, they, you know, focused, you know, started to talk more about, you know, the world free

of nuclear weapons which is fine and this is consistent with the u.s. policy, by the debate on credibility of self-deterrence is a limit one-sides, so we'd like to see it come back. second one vis-a-vis north korea, we try to have deterrence and when we talk deterrence we basically we are talking about deterrence by punishment; right? but when we talk about, you know, north korea, you know deterches by punishment doesn't work because you know when they use nuclear weapons against us, that would not be based on rational character rations, but they attack us with nukings with a dying cause; right? it would be a suicidal attack. in this case, deterrent by punishment does not work very

well; right? so what we do is to both try to boast deterrence by denial capabilities, and by doing so we entered and decided to introduce missile systems and boast what we call a civil protection com is actually defense. thirdly, with we talk about deterrence vis-a-vis china, certainly we talk to the american partners to boast all kinds of comprehensive defensive abilities, but in addition to that, last year the government of japan revised what's call national defense program guidelines which is a kind of basic document for the defense policy of japan in which we started to talk about dynamic defense, and which is puzzles a few people, people get puzzled

and what do you mean by that? it means actually we kind of came to focus more on peacetime, kind of strategic tug-of-war with china in that we are not talking about fighting wars with china; right? we are engaged in this, you know, kind of comprehensive coercive, you know, game of tug-of-war with china over the islands, and that's not taiwan. [laughter] hopefully. [laughter] and over the, you know, over the natural rowses deposited in east china sea, so when we talk about that in defense, we are talking about, you know, kind of increasing a kind of level presence of armed force and coast guard vessels in that region in the area in order to

kind of check chinese naval activities and check chinese maritime, commercial maritime activities and things like that. second point, how does the kind of ideas come to, you know, get translated into a strategy? in case of the doctrine, when the prim minister decided to, you know, engage, perform this u.s. alliance relationship with the u.s., it was in the 1950s; right? at that time, he was, you know, the doctrine was not regarded as a doctrine. it was doctrinized, the concepts was doctrinized in the 1960s and 1970s by people like, you know, serious scholars like yono,

professor of the university and people like professor -- and they doctrinized the doctrine, and recently, many scholars started to distinguish really what the prime minister said and what the professors said about this doctrine, and they actually himself did not talk about, you know, cheap riding strategy. he was willing -- he was kind of chose -- made that strategic choice back in the 1950s because that was the only viable and promising option, but in the 1960s and 1970s, they kind of -- actually said in the book the

world in japan, japan has to become more normal. he didn't use the word, but in the future, but, you know, of course, they made a different pact that's been doctored about what he thought. you know, they talked about continue newty -- continuity between them and i agree with that because when we decided that dpj government decided to return this, you know, captain around his fishing boat into a japanese vessels last year, you know, we kind of, the government, japanese government decided to back off; right? it was criticized for being soft on china, but, you know, what

prime minister did in 2004 was to return those chinese, you know, landed on the island. they just returned them right away so i mean, he was -- he got great stats for being soft on china, so there is a continue -- but the distinction that we have to make in the ldp back then and how the dpj was, you know, they had very different policy views towards the united states. thanks. >> thank you, and my apologies about that. we have 5-7 minutes for questions and discussion, and i was talking about with henry earlier, one of the good things bouts working at the department of defense now is nobody expects me to be polite. [laughter] i will be quite brutal in my policing up of things. if i can suggest we can perhaps

take a stack of three questions and ask people to actually get very quickly to the questions and then turn them over to our panelists for their thoughts and responses. please. start over here. >> thank you very much. my question is through the professor. if you have the price of the dpj one or dpj2 or lpj, on that site, the price of the location of both parties, and wop more, is there any possibility of cooperation in this issue between the ldp and dpj? >> thank you.

a second. back of the room over there. >> daniel wallfield, graduate student from george washington university. how prepared is japan with increased cooperation with its regional neighbors, particularly with south korea? >> a final question, also at the back. >> joe bosco. we heard an up add inventory -- inadvertent comment towards taiwan. [laughter] it was regard to the countries that have provided humanitarian assistance over the disasters. turns out that taiwan provided more than any other country, and yet there was no thank you to that government. >> if we can take the questions in order, and dick, if you want

to address the dpj question first. >> yeah, it's a great question because it's something we spent a lot of time to figure out, and the best we could do which is what i'm going to do now which is to acknowledge the dpj is all over the map. the dpj is a mutt just to be clear. it's a mutt. it has a lot of progenitors and within it folks are military hedgers and balancers, some of whom had cabinet positions. there are those who are economic hedgers who were the advisers to the first dpj prime minister, the band wagoners with china. you remember they are 300 closest personal friends in beijing at the same time the prime minister was announcing that they would -- from an american perspective that japan would renag on the agreement, so

there are folks in that quadrant as well. i don't want to speak for mici, but the current migration has gone to the northeast here so there's dual hedgers in place, and that that makes them not completely distujt from the ldp as we last saw in power. >> a great question, and the second part, the prospects for cooperation, coring's with whom? -- cooperation with whom? sorry -- oh, a different question, okay. i'll stay away from that. >> i would say that the prime minister didn't mean to be in the north western region, but he was stumbling into the north western region by picking up on this sensitive -- he didn't mean to, but they did went in, you

know, when he did go into this band wagoning area, so -- but kaun i would say, they have, you know the dpj moved to the east to being integrated area. on the second question, i would say, yes, south korea, a cooperation with south korea is certainly important, and we are talking about modernizing the u.s.-japan alliance, and we have a u.s. alliance, and we are trying to trilaterallizing this alliance, and as i said, you know, it -- i talked about national defense program guidelines which we revised last year in which we -- after we talked about growing partnership or developing partnership with different -- several key countries, south korea,

southeast asian countries and india, and how and why? because these are the countries with which we tend to share values and strategies and orientations, and so we think that also in that document, we talked about changing american -- >> >> what? >> changing american position -- i forgot, but there was a mention about changing american position in the international view in the world which means -- we didn't say declining view as changes u.s. position. >> changing deterrent power. >> okay. you can now take a look at the document, but anyway, because we think that after japan is not rising and declining and the u.s. may be its position is not declining, but relative, you know, there is a relative

decline of the u.s. position particularly with china, so what we are trying to do is we have to mobilize new partners, you know? we have to look to find new partners to make the balance right, so those are the countries that we think will be and hope that will be a, you know, emerging future strategic partners thank you. >> this point is really very important, and it struck me in reading the original -- the original report that became the national defense program guidelines that there was a centerpiece in it that did not get much attention which was the expectation. this is my reading, certainly not the way the media dealt with it, but my reading, there was the exception that united states is in relative decline, full stop, and that cost of the united states in relative

decline on this account there's at least three consequences. one was the decline in deterrence power. we read it as a decline, an expectation, a cline, a. b, the united states demands more of its allies which is if you're a chief writer, you know, you have to deal with that, and third, that there would be less provision of public goods in the region, and so you have to step up to that, so the japanese had an open conversation about something that i think the media and most of the rest of us missed on precisely this question, and i think that gets to she la's -- shea la's question she asked if there's a new sense growing in japan to realign its national security strategy, and we'll starting to see it bubble up in this way. >> if i can give you one minute to take a whack at it. >> i'll do that in one way, and

it's a comment i wanted to make on the paper which is it ends on a very interesting question and that is what happens when these schools of thought in different countries align differently; right? i immediately thought which administration, the obama administration and dpj, and then it's a japan panel. what i think we ought to be aware of and this speaks to the gentleman's question about taiwan because i don't know the answers in specifics why they want sanks, but we have to formulate policy on north korea which they be in the campaign into the election of 2009 because they adopted issues and it was clarity on north korea. second, there was clarity on doing as much as possible to improve the relationship with south korea and, again, the dpj came in with a very different sense of the dip plo mootic

comparative of reconciliation with both south korea and china, and i think they've been fairly successful with reorienting on south korea. the relationship today is very, very close. the tie won piece -- china is not so close. they've have various difficulties over the last year, but 2010 with a new party in power learning how to make pragmatic choices in the moment, in crisis scenarios; right, you had north korea, two incidences with them, the issue between japan and china, clearly taiwan, we don't know where they stand or sit and the choices to be tensions, for example, and this brings full circle back to the electoral transitions coming next year which people have not mentioned, but there's leadership changes throughout northeast asia that matters to these questions next year. taiwan, south korea, russia, who

am i missing? we have an election, china will have a transition, a significant leader transition, japan may have an election next year. the questions you're talking about here really come to a head potentially to give you more empirical data for this project next year. >> well, let me thank our three panelists for what was a very rich and worthwhile and interesting discussion. i wish we had more time for q&a and conversation, but i'm trying to give some time back to the organizers and i will also say for me personally that the time pressure will spare me any danger of inadd vert tonightly of committing policy which is also very good for me. thank you for a very good discussion. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> for over two decades, bin laden has been al-qaeda's leader and symbol and continued to plot attacks against our country and friends and allies. the death of bin laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our nation's effort to defeat al-qaeda. watch the president's announcement and reactions from cabinet officials, capitol hill, and around the world all in their entirety whenever you want online with the c-span video library. search, watch, clip, and share. it's washington, your way. ..

i love your chosen profession, the restoration of journalism. obviously it's world press freedom day. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> the committee on homeland security subcommittee and counter intelligence will come to order. the subcommittee today is meeting to hear testimony about the threat of the u.s. homeland emanating from pakistan. let me take a moment to make an opening statement. i like to welcome everybody to today's subcommittee on counterterrorism and intelligence hearing. i look forward to hearing from today's witnesses in the ongoing danger emanating from pakistan

to the united states and the intent and capability of the various terrorist organizations operating in pakistan to strike the u.s. homeland. at the outset, i want to let everyone know that today's hearing will be interrupted at 3:00 p.m. due to a classified briefing from cia or pineda, and ctc later and secretary saying for. i asked patients from eyewitnesses and thank you ahead of time to the extent you are able to accommodate this. today's hearing is the third year in the sub committee has held aimed at educating members about the immediate terrorist threats to the homeland in the various parts of the world and so far we've heard from experts on the threat posed by aqap in yemen in the northeast africa on the counterterrorism effort.

today's hearings also, in historic moment in the global war on terrorism in the last 48 hours not the direction of president obama and the result of the incredible work the u.s. military, intelligence community and the law enforcement al qaeda leader 9/11 mastermind osama bin laden was killed by u.s. forces deep inside pakistan. this is a critical blow to al qaeda in the ideology of islam. it's a victory for the united states and allies around the world and as president obama stated, the world is a safer, more secure place, as a result of bin laden's death. i commend president obama and his national security team for the planning, execution of the mission for taking the enormous risk to eliminate bin laden, the nation is grateful for his leadership. were also deeply grateful to the men and women who carried out the mission, their dedication, professionalism and sacrifice exemplified the best of our

fighting forces. today's hearing was originally for the darius terrorist nation in pakistan in intent and capability to strike the u.s. homeland. we'll still conduct an examination, but in light of the events of the last 72 hours, will try to make sense of the important questions of the weekly debate, including the extent to which pakistan is cooperating in the fight against terrorism. i'd like to highlight the fact that pakistan has provided enormous assistance in the last decade and the fight against al qaeda, including critical intelligence and military operations. in fact, a critical ally to the west for decades. they've lost thousands of soldiers and innocent civilians in the fight against islamic militant. they've also been responsible for capturing and killing more terrorists inside pakistan by a large margin. their efforts would be commended in the united states must

continue to foster this united states pakistan relationship. we must make this relationship work. but despite this the threat from al qaeda and affiliated groups remains as dangerous as it did last friday. in fact cia to her panetta said with a will of mentioned and must remain vigilant and resolute. any and it's even more dangerous in the days and weeks ahead after his demise. this is most obvious last may when pakistani five social side drove into times square and attempt to kill hundreds of people. travel to pakistan received training from the sentencing hearing that his attack was retribution for u.s. trouncing pakistan. richard prince has been a driver and a passably must be on guard. i look forward to hearing from today's witnesses on the merit of terrorist groups operating in

pakistan and their intent capabilities for the homeland. these evolving groups present huge challenges to the united states and it's critical we as members of congress do everything we can to understand the threat, especially in light of bin laden's killing and its ramifications. nevertheless, certain plaques -- certain facts are clear as they are disturbing. osama bin laden was the world's most wanted terrorist. he was discovered not in the case of word for a turn saudi arabia or even iran as pakistani interior mock moodily suggested when visiting members of congress traveled to the area in 2009, he was discovered in a mansion fortress, prominent for its size as well as the location and abbottabad, a well populated

india sure way from pakistan's military academy. the president's counterterrorism adviser, john brennan, states today that osama bin laden that in the compound first exteriors and john brennan's words, it's inconceivable that bin laden did not have a support system in the country that allowed him to remain there for an extended period of time. members of congress have a responsibility to ask, what kind of support system or nurse could have enabled in london to maintain this safe even? what should pakistani officials have known about such support systems and who should have known it? how should a mansion complex of the team for laws can avoid the scrutiny the investigative military and government officials who make it their business to know what's going on around them. why'd he pakistani not investigate other tremendous

time of fiscal challenge here at home, the united states is asking citizens to support the expenditure of billions of dollars of military and pakistani and foreign aid to pakistan. before i turn to ranking member, i'd like to make one more important point about osama bin laden's killing. i'm heartened to note the last thing bin laden saw before her death was an american soldier buried down on him with an american flag on the shoulder, that he reportedly died using a woman as a human shield is an image that cements the true nature of his character in such a cowardice will be part of his legacy. bin laden's demise will not diminish the pain for the sake of the family of 9/11 or diminish the threat of terrorism that emanates from this complex region. but it closes a chapter fulfills our nation's promise with respect to bin laden we would not rest until justice is

served. i look forward to hearing from today's witnesses and the chair now recognizes ranking minority member of the subcommittee and the gentlewoman from california, ms. speier for any creations she may have ms. speier for any creations she may have ms. speier for any creations she may have on characters from pakistan. i'm sending it to on characters from pakistan. i'm sending it to hearing took on a new dynamic is the world learned that the mastermind of 9/11 and inspirational leader for numerous other terrorist plot was killed in a firefight with u.s. special forces. the death of bin laden as many have stated asked monumental achievement internation's effort to defeat al qaeda. so many people deserve recognition for their steadfast efforts and sacrifice of the last 10 years. three presidents, military and homeland intelligence community, but we must not rest on our laurels either. while al qaeda may be symbolized

by the modern, the terrorist network is much bigger than just 10. we must remain vigilant as affiliated groups and radicalized individuals pursue attacks against us. with bin laden's death, we are left asking, what's next for al qaeda? how real is the threat of retaliation? and how will a relationship with pakistan be impacted quite pakistan has been a key ally in terrorism efforts against al qaeda and other extremist groups in the region. pakistani soldiers have lost their lives fighting against the taliban and al qaeda and pakistani governments have helped us disrupt and dismantle terror network since 9/11. but what did they know and what should they have known about bin laden's whereabouts in the massive compound about 30 miles outside of islamabad, where he was living. bin laden was not found in a cave. the compound was less than

two miles away from an elite package and the army training academy. and we have to question how he was able to hide in plain sight for such a long period of time. we've also heard several disturbing reports including the recent statement for admiral mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, indicating some pakistani intelligence services have ties to certain terrorist groups. we must attempt to answer these critical questions because the her relationship with the pakistani government is dependent on what we discover. pakistan appears to have become the breeding ground for a variety of terrorist organizations, including al qaeda. while bin laden compound demonstrates they are spread throughout the country, much terrorist threat is concentrated in the thought-out on the western border of afghanistan. the fiercely autonomous area has been home to numerous terrorist organization since 9/11 and au pair list that western aid workers can provide any effect

or services they are. the social forces make these areas ripe for terrorist? how can we change that dynamic? although we've had some success targeting key militants in this area since 9/11, the terrorist networks are present simply relocating to other parts of the country. now we must determine how to snuff out bin laden legacy and to what extent al qaeda will continue or speed up plotting against the west. throughout the sub six and beyond, new groups have rivaled al qaeda for their deadliness and willingness to attack the u.s., both in the region and here at home. ttp has been gaining momentum for the past several years and display to reach that shocked many american officials when the ttp trained pakistani americans faisal shahzad detonated a car bomb in new york. ttp including the haqqani

network operate hand-in-hand with al qaeda in pakistan, making the region a hotbed of extremism. it has become widely apparently existing groups in pakistan has embraced the ideological cancer of al qaeda and while we want to leave they pose little threat to america, we now are gravely concerned. at the top of this list is the lat, the global jihad is organization by carrying out the move by attacks in 2008. various media reports have speculated lat may have grown closer to al qaeda both ideologically and operationally. the death of the lot and bring these loosely associated groups closer together and raised the threat to the united states homeland? we certainly know that the radicalism preached by these groups presents a serious danger to religious minorities such as the commodities women and political opposition leaders in

pakistan. and seems to be getting to work, weakening the will of the pakistani government to work with us. when the pakistani government has mustered a political will, however, the army has been in launching devastating attacks against militants. how do we ensure that they are working with us to combat all terrorist groups in the region? shouldn't we also proactively attack the source of extremism by investing more in economic and social opportunities in pakistan so that the youths do not turn to terrorism? i look forward to your inner witness' testimony today because finding solution to these questions requires a better understanding of an extremely complex threat environment. again, i'd like to commend the president for his courage in all the brave men and women that put their lives on the line for our security and thank them for the sacrifices they have made for all of us here at home. i yield back.

>> tedium that, ms. speier. i'm also grateful to have the attendance of mr. king from new york and i'd like to invite mr. king to make any kind of opening statements he may wish to do. >> thank you. let me commend you for their fiduciary hearing we've conduct at this year. the chairman of the subcommittee on counterterrorism and intelligence. even the ranking member did an outstanding job and i commend you for it. let me also join with everyone here in commending the president of the united states were killing of osama bin laden. the courage by the president and people i've spoken to are involved in the whole operation. the fact is when the president made his decision, there was no specific evidence that bin laden was in that compound. with a collection of circumstantial evidence, but

take courage by the president to make the decision to go ahead with the set operation had not failed. he put himself and our country on the line and succeeded and again chose to capacity for the commander-in-chief and i commend you for it. i also cross commend the navy seals who carried out the operation under extraordinary conditions at night, not knowing what was going to await them when they went into the compound. also not knowing if the flight to afghanistan could be intercepted. so all in all this is an extraordinary issue and we had to commend all of them. you're hearing today is particularly topical, just a little over an hour ago i met with the pakistani mission, the united states and expressed are the real concerns that i and many people have about pakistan's role in the war against terrorism. i remember back in 1998 when the

african embassies were attacked and president clinton wanted to retaliate by firing rockets to the al qaeda compounds in afghanistan and we advise the pakistan government that rockets would be going through the airspace and the result was al qaeda was bin laden was not killed. he could've been killed on that day 13 years ago and things would've been much different. so we had this mixed relationship with pakistan all along. i remember two days after september 11, where he told us the first priority was to have the secretary of state tell president musharraf of pakistan that it was time to be with us or against us. at that time, pakistan did cooperate for a period of time at least. since then, the record has been mixed. there's no doubt there were elements in the isi, which have not been supportive opposition, which have at least a dual loyalty.

but he was a feeling that we got more from the relationship that we lost and on balance pakistan because of its strategic position in possession of nuclear weapons, the access they have to intelligence that this was a relationship that on balance was in our favor. the event over weeks then you have this compound rate is the chairman pointed out so close to an academy in pakistan, the fact that the isi maintained headquarters closed tight. the fact that the neighborhood was populated by many prominent with officials there for six years, osama bin laden was living in the compound. it really raises -- there's only one answer to me. two possibilities one entry. one is simply elements of the pakistani government or pakistani intelligence is entirely inept and that is not

proven to be the case over the years. in fact, some of us raised the issue, does the isi spent more time tracking down members of the cia than a dozen members of al qaeda? is a crossroads, i believe, in relationship with pakistan. we've had good days and that is in pakistan. they are essential to success in the war against terrorism, but we cannot allow situations to access were the most notorious terrorist -- mass murder in the world was literally living right under the nose of pakistani government officials. i look forward to hearing today. i hope you can find a way forward is pakistan, but again the events of the last several days have a definite crossroads of that relationship. let me thank all the witnesses for giving me time and expertise is very important. when they give special thanks to doc kagan who i had the pleasure of meeting with the number of times, the first back in 2007

when he was the research policy in iraq, which everyone said could never work and think of the president. so thank you for your service. i yield back to the chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. other members of the committee have reminded the opening statements may be submitted for the record. we are pleased to afford us to wish would be for us today on this important topic. let me remind the witnesses your entire written statement will appear in the record and sell you cannot stick to the you can to focus your comments with appreciation for the five-minute dash for the five-minute battle. so today's first witnesses frederick kagan. it is my understanding you have to leave the hearing early to attend a personal issue and i want to remind you members that

we may have questions from others for you, which will be submitted to you in writing and i hope that you would be able to be responsive. due to the time constraints, i'm going to dispense biographies on today's witnesses, but i will point out that dr. kagan was one of the principal authors of the surge in iraq and i want to thank you during that difficult time in our nations history. i also understand he just returned from afghanistan so you have a fresh perspective from the theater we will make available to anybody who asked for full biographies as we have prepared for a very distinguished panel. for dr. kagan, you are now recognized to summarize the testimonies. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for your kind words. and thank you to the entire subcommittee for holding this series of hearing and for the

way that they have been framed. i'm going to try to keep my remarks focused to factly as i think the committee has posed a series of questions, which is to say, let us focus on diagnosing the problem. let us focus on understanding the challenge in detail and a new one and let us understand that there is no immediate obvious therefore cause that emerges at the end of the long series of wherefores that we can lay out here because i will not opine on the degree of complicity of the pakistani government in this al qaeda -- bin laden's presence because i don't know when i won't offer opinions about it. but i will say that the comments of chairman kean and the ranking member here are absolutely right. at the end of the day, there is no simple solution to the

problems we face with pakistan and the challenging and frustrating is the relationship is then, we've experimented with simple solutions like cutting pakistani aid completely of touring pakistan over. we have experimented with more generous and it not clear what effect any of that behavior has, but it is clear in general terms, things don't go well for us when we simply decide to treat pakistan. whatever degree of support for either our enemies are for us to pack a cd showing, i think we need to recognize it. we need to understand it and we need to develop what will have to be inevitably a frustrating and less complicated policy approach that will serve our interests and not merely satisfy our peak summer which is understandable. but at the end of the day is not a sufficient patience for making that kind of call. the roll call of bad organizations, dangerous

organizations that we can take more than the five minutes allotted for statement simply to list them all. the bottom line is that pakistan is home to probably the tensest concentration of the most dangerous militant islamist organizations in the world in the number of those have been allowed to run fairly free within pakistani territory for a variety of reasons. al qaeda central has been whittled down substantially from the fairly sized has been whittled down substantially from the fairly sized who fled to down substantially from the fairly sized who fled to pakistan in 2001 to a handful of core leadership with their support, including bin laden most recently killed in the pakistanis have cooperated with that in the pakistani cooperation has been essential to making that happen and we should note that the sacrifices of many.

in addition to a lashkar-e-taiba is an incredible teachers organization and an organization that historically we have tended to underestimate because it has been been traditionally as a kashmiri separatist movement in something focused on finding kashmir and the truth was never a kashmiri separatist movement. he was always an islamist militant movement sharing a common ideology with al qaeda and in some cases it chose to focus on kashmir when that seemed appropriate, but it has always harbored larger ambitions than not, including ambitions that set the entire subcontinent on fire is carried out, which they nearly did and ambitions to strike as directly as well. i think the threat from lashkar-e-taiba is extremely significant and unfortunately one of the pakistanis. a clear rest were detained

senior members of lashkar-e-taiba is fundamentally pakistan has taken no real action against this group that has had the mexican cement is a matter of concern. the taliban and pakistan is another group where understanding is essential because the ttp was formed to serve as an impeachable organization that approves musharraf's complicity with tyson fighting against islamist. and i have details in my testimony about how the ttp has broken down into northern and southern groups that are more anti-pakistani, but there is a group of the ttp that is focused in waziristan agencies that goes beyond the simple hatred of pakistan and actually seems to be willing potentially to be refocused on us, including most notably with the times square attack. that is a group we have to be

concerned about and it's ironic the pakistanis have showed quite a lot of blood fighting ttp and have children it out of its most significant safe haven in south waziristan and are now fighting it by sure agency with also significant loss of life and effort. however, it is not clear that the pakistanis will fight to eliminate that group in its also not clear that group -- pakistani threat from that group. they're a number of other organizations which have each mention because the panel experts will bring them out. let me just close quickly by framing a policy problem by not offering you a recommendation and apologies for that. three things are going to have to happen in pakistan in my view before pakistan is really able to get a handle on this militant

islamism in ways that secures some stability for not threat in ways that ensure our security. first, the ruling elite will have to come to a consensus that supporting some islamist groups as proxies either in afghanistan or india is a failing strategy in the safari in the importance of caring for and a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign general mcchrystal began an petraeus is carrying on is so essential. we must demonstrate to them this is not going to succeed. second, they will have to come to a consensus that all militant islamists pose a threat to pakistan and none are at the end of the day you will too be controlled by the state and used reliably and safely as proxies. heard, this will be most difficult, they will have to come to a consensus about the need to conduct what will be long, very bloody, expensive and difficult operations against a number of these organizations that are rather deeply rooted in pakistani society and go beyond

those subsets into the punjab into the pakistani heartland. i believe u.s. policy can directly affect those by making it clear to pakistan that its proxies in afghanistan will fail and i think i strategy is advocating negotiating with the taliban, trying to wrap this thing up is the worst thing we could possibly do from a standpoint of long-term stability in the region and the well-being of pakistan because it will merely reinforce the motion that fighting by proxy is a successful strategy. as for the others, we will have to develop a complicated and nuanced strategy for influence pakistan to develop these consensus after or in tandem with our efforts to show them the proxy warfare will not succeed. thank you for the opportunity to testify. >> thank you, dr. kagan. our next witness will be the

senior political scientist of reincorporation assert not pakistan, afghanistan and counterinsurgency efforts in the region and has spent years working with the u.s. special operations forces. dr. jones coming your recognize to summarize your testimony please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, chairman king. thank you members of the committee for having this hearing. it is very important to have a frank discussion of this issue because it is one that risks american lives. let me first start out by saying that the chairman noted earlier i recently left a u.s. special operations command working at the pentagon and before that special operations forces in afghanistan and would like to think those colleagues have participated in the raid against osama bin laden, both for their bravery and patriotism.

i had the pleasure of working with some of them and salute what they've done for the nation. let me begin by focusing on what i consider a very important question that the united states now faces. i come back to the pakistan and a second. but the questionnaires, now now that osama bin laden is dead, how will the nature of the threat emanating from pakistan to evolve clicks the threat to the u.s. homeland? this is again one that threatens american lives, so setting aside for the purpose of the series omegamon, somalia and other areas which are important, i will focus my comments on this. the way i see this trend in and with rbc movement in this direction is probably slightly more decentralized and diffuse threat facing the u.s. homeland from pakistan.

this has, in my view, enormous implications for how to think about the efforts. it remains probably five -- i would characterize five tiers. one is the central al qaeda that continues to exist in pakistan. so we have questions certainly now about bin laden and his hideout. similar questions one can also ask about al qaeda's number two, possibly number one. where is simon also weary and how much does the pakistan government have of his whereabouts. we know historically he has been targeted by the u.s. by pakistan in january. he was targeted by u.s. forces that targeted the affair was not successful, but certainly there are similar questions. they're also affiliated groups. we've seen a threat to the

homeland from groups like al qaeda in the arabian peninsula in yemen. third, à la groups of al qaeda in certainly in pakistan we see threat to the u.s. homeland from several including ttp and lashkar-e-taiba, which have been mentioned here. in my personal view, will potentially pose a more serious threat to the u.s. homeland over the next several years. for, allied networks, some of which have been involved in a series of attacks are received including london attacks in 2005 and finally at fort dix in other areas, simply inspired attackers. in my view as we've seen them as ranking member mentioned earlier, we have come very close, i would say lucky, from being attacked by terrorists trained in pakistan. the shahzad case being one example. as i see being another. i think the threat from pakistan is extremely serious right now. we see at the plots from

individuals like ilya caja heery based in pakistan against targets in india, europe and also potentially against the u.s. homeland. we have al qaeda americans in pakistan right now. haven't found from riverside california, shipper juma who among other places lived in florida, operating out of pakistan right now. so i would say we have a very serious vested interest in continuing to capture rich killed the source of the homeland including americans. i would say is for the down the line at the issue of pakistan, this could move one of two directions. one would be an unfortunate reality, the relationship the u.s. had the money to 90s after the missiles were not good, with the relationship was virtually nonexistent in a serious strategic way.

the other is where the relationship moved after the september 11 attacks. more productive relationship captured khalid sheikh mohammed, now she. the capture of serious al qaeda members. my personal view, pakistan has a very serious series of options right now. we have the book of al qaeda's central leadership operating in pakistan. will it help us capture the rest of this organization? only facts on the ground will be able to tell. the last thing on the very briefly is one particular concern i would have and i continue to have, the u.s. has identified pakistan government relations with the two groups that are of concern. one is the haqqani network. the other is lashkar-e-taiba appeared both of those groups

have direct senior-level relationships with al qaeda. that is unacceptable for the united state in my personal view and must change for that relationship to become more days. finally, this is a long war that winston churchill observed over a century ago during the struggles of the northwest frontier. time in this area is measured in decades, not months or years, but it would say based on the threat seen in pakistan, we do not how much time. if thank you. >> thank you, dr. jones. i'm thankful for your testimony. next is visiting fellow at the carnegie institute of international peace. today get that right, tankel? you are now recognized for your testimony. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ranking member speier and members of the committee. we have spoken about by the

ramifications of osama bin laden's demise and the impact this will have on the u.s.-pakistan relationship. going to keep the focus of my testimony on lashkar-e-taiba, the group i was asked to speak specifically about today though i do want to concur with others about the importance of u.s.-pakistan relationship and the need to find ways to make the relationship work better than it is right now. what continued existence has become a major contributor to u.s. and pakistan, particularly since the 2008 bold by attacks through group -- pakistani faces an insurgency in l.e.t.'s policies to refrain from attacks against the state. the security establishment appears to be taking a triage approach, focusing first on those groups launching attacks in pakistan and avoiding action that could draw l.e.t. as americanization into the insurgency. this is despite the fact the numbers of dead in l.e.t. are

contributing to the war in pakistan. a second, pakistan army and isi have long considered l.e.t. to be the most reliable proxy against india and within those institutions still perceive it to provide utility in this regard. third, l.e.t. is more than just a militant group. it's also a missionary organization that places strong emphasis on preaching and social welfare and significant societal support and influence. my incudes threefold, to detail l.e.t.'s abilities home or abroad, to assist the group's intent in this regard and have a federal course as a possible the robust capabilities as others have alluded to enable to contribute to attacks against u.s. interests in following ways. first is a training provider. the group as well as western workers in collaboration in

pakistan, so too is frustrating. second, a daily organization that western would be terrorists can use to access other outfits, including al qaeda. your company can act as a facilitator for terrorist attacks providing logistical and financial support to other outfits the transnational networks which conservatively speaking stretch across south asia, persian gulf and europe. in addition to action as part of a consortium, l.e.t. is capable of unilateral attacks against western interests. this scenario is less likely and this brings us to the issue of l.e.t. intent. the court l.e.t. intent continues to prioritize at the humane entity and the group is never considered itself an al qaeda affiliate. however, it is also always been a groups information. liberating kashmir and in the indian subcontinent is the first rather than final step and has

contributed to al qaeda's fight against the u.s. and its allies 9/11. operational collaboration between the groups has grown closer in recent years. according to pakistan, the isi continues to pressure lat leaders to refrain from launching another terrorist attack in india as this could trigger a war or an attack against america. this may reduce the chances of unilateral l.e.t. attack in the homeland, at least in the near-term. however, the current threat to u.s. interests comes from a conglomeration of actors in pakistan, al qaeda, l.e.t. and others do not l.e.t. does not need to take the lead role in attack in order for its capabilities to be used against the u.s. homeland or american interests abroad. furthermore, individuals for factions can utilize domestic infrastructure as well as transnational capabilities to pursue their operations about leadership consent. because members who l.e.t. do not have ties to the group for

neighboring element, the threat also comes from the last card network. because l.e.t. remains influenced by regional dynamics, it is worth considering briefly how the modern steps might reshape environment at the kashmir conflict, which is where the name would be difficult for l.e.t. in the insurgency. members continue to integrate further into the afghan insurgency that unlike the taliban it doesn't have a major constituency in afghanistan. bin laden said could create space for solution and if so lat may find it of for the first time in two decades. this will impact its behavior group cohesion and may lead some to seek other opportunities, particularly terrorist attacks against india, pakistan or the u.s. however, might also provide for others to demobilize. if i may come a few brief recommendations specific to l.e.t. that being said, dismantling the group must be a gradual process in order to avoid a backlash and

will require a paradigm shift within the army and the isi and the india-pakistan relations. what courses of action should the u.s. consider? first, accelerate actions necessary for a global tape down of l.e.t., continued to pursue and support india and bangladesh and increase cooperation with nepal, sri lanka, where sub networks are currently expanding. the u.s. must also push for greater cooperation in intelligence sharing vis-à-vis allies in the polls. second with regard to pakistan specifically, in the near-term continued to signal the severe repercussions that would result for l.e.t. be involved in attack on american interests and continue to press pakistan for intelligence regarding the international networks and begin taking tips to degrade its apparatus. toward the medium term, increase focus on building pakistan's counterterrorism capacity be a

civilian law enforcement and intelligence agent is. finally prepare for the long-term, push for designing a deradicalization demobilization and reintegration program and explore the costs, benefit and feasibility of doing so by working with a third party such as saudi arabia. i understand these recommendations do not offer immediate gratification it is the world with sma and a persistence in part oration to pay off. thank you for inviting me to testify today. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, mr. tankel. i neglected to say you were finishing your book. any country and to give you a plug for lashkar-e-taiba, a very learned presence here today. may take one more bit of housekeeping. i ask unanimous consent that the member the full committee.

without objection so ruled. thank you, mr. marino. for our final testimony, the witnesses shoo out the whys, director of southeast or sun or at the atlantic council of the united states, a native of pakistan provides expertise on the region in a multitude of forms and is the author of the 2008 vote, crossed swords. pakistan, army and the wars within. you are now recognized to summarize your testimony for five minutes. thank you, mr. chairman. can i ask if you're -- >> thank you, mr. chairman. ranking member subtyping members of the subcommittee, i monarchs before you on this critical subject of concern to the united states, pakistan and need i say

the rest of the world. i shall take a macro approach to the situation in pakistan and especially the relationship of the united states. as steve tankel has taught about the sub for another organizations. i should recognize the pakistan today is a magnet and a haven for terrorists. it is an internal conflict, weapon in society and the sagging economy and education system that is not preparing youth adequately for the 21st century. the killing of osama bin laden will not have these underlying condition that spawn terrorism, but it is an inflection point that could help us change the relationship with pakistan perhaps for the better. as the chairman said, we must make this relationship work.

i believe the issues of militancy and terrorism have to be examined both from a national and regional perspective. there is no. as the beatles told us, money can't buy you love. so throwing money at the problem is not a real solution after nearly $1 trillion in iraq and afghanistan have proven already. just as we do, our partners around the world are looking forward fact, consistency and honesty in relationships. the united states needs to think long term and not even in the short term with those longer-term object is designed. in supporting an autocratic military regime in the past, we ignore the needs of the people of pakistan and led to the disenfranchisement is civil and military elite. both the soviet after we exited the scene, pakistan took on a deeper regional role, focusing

on historical rival, india and uprisings across the eastern border in kashmir. they came home to roost in later years as the warriors of jihad outgrew their control and widen the scope of the duties beyond kashmir to india proper and now perhaps to europe and north america. meanwhile the appearance of shrinking technologies and the ability to raise funds from across the globe and train people allow these groups to attract warriors from the homelands in the last. the military regime that we supported him and he immediate left a legacy of education systems that degraded learning institutions, stunted administrative machinery and relied on political engineering or manipulation to manage its liking. today we place a huge challenge is and, the democratic timebomb is ticking but the median age of

about 20 years, roughly 60 million years out of a population of 180 million are between 16 and 25 and earlier so you and not employed. and they live in a state that is unbridled, click credit behavior among the leaders. all attention has been focused on the u.s.-pakistan relationship, i believe the greatest influence on the rise of terrorism in pakistan is the lack of governance. the country faces an economic crisis due in part to robo sharks, but to a larger extent governmental ineptitude or lack of basic reforms. the conflict of poor governance terminal shots to the economy have helped create a perfect backdrop to the violent culture terrorism in pakistan. the earth and sea to enable pakistan today is a huge task for which pakistan has largely relied on military force.

in the past, the army has changed his training regimen to focus on counterinsurgency, but it still doesn't have the relationship between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in mind as mr. tankel just explained. that is the weakness inside pakistan and also needs many tools. helicopters for mobility and attacking hailey mobile terrorists. most of all, it will be the political will to undertake these efforts, particularly inside and will improve its procedures and processes. the united states and 30 working with some elements of civil society, but much more needs to be done. mr. chairman, ranking members, members of the committee, the u.s. can and should play a role in existing pakistan in order to prevent the rise of terrorism that could attack the homeland.

but i believe it's in pakistan's own entries to undertake the difficult policy changes that would allow it to focus on all terrorist groups operating inside its borders. we must insist on an honest dialogue and reward honesty with honesty. we must follow a two-pronged policy helping change the social economic and political landscape in helping pakistan set up a broad-based counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operation. the u.s. should also invest in a major infrastructure projects that will become a lasting reminder of u.s. assistance. the largest single potential in my view for improving pakistan security and economy is the normalization of relations with india. a process that is now beginning to show signs of revival. to give you an idea of increased trade between the two countries rising from 2 billion a year to between 40 and 100 leaving here

would radically alter the lives of people on both sides of the border. pakistan will be a more confident and secure pakistan and in my view is stable and secure pakistan can help create a stable salvation and the safer united states. thank you. >> thank you, mr. nawaz. i want to thank each of the members of the distinguished panel for your testimony. are facing a very difficult circumstance and not with god some hearings that we've got a tan in a classified p.m., which is now untold going to be followed by a series of votes. and so in recognition of what that significant delay would mean an out of respect are your time as well, under the money going to limit the questioning to myself, the ranking member

and for some looted questions now perhaps at some point in time we have the agreement of the committee and we can follow up again on this very, very important topic with you with panelists because i think there is some significant questioning that can be done. i thank you for your preparation and i hope we can do more to follow up on it. allow me for a moment to begin. at this point in time he made a comment about not dealing with the taliban. am i correct in that assessment? says something you said? >> i said this is not the moment to pursue a negotiated settlement for the television in my opinion. >> most of the analyses i've read recently seem to suggest that that need be a critical aspect to our ability for the united states to unwind its

current military commitment to the region that may be including the idea of finding some kind of a political solution with taliban. it's your belief at this time would be unwise strategy? >> i will keep my answers short, but in fact very long. first of all, they're not all that many surgeons that were actually resolved by a negotiated with the insurgency. it's a nonhistorical model. it's an import from the bosnia kosovo model that is informing the thinking, but those were not urgencies. those are civil wars. so i'm not sure what the historical base as our examples of the negotiation. in particular what i would say right now is that we have -- we are changing the military situation on the ground in afghanistan dramatically this year. i believe we will begin to see changes in the political dynamic in afghanistan as well. we've just made progress, some

symbolic progress with the death of bin laden. one negotiates best at moments of strength and we have not yet reached our position of strength and success nor have the taliban reached a position of greatest weakness. i think we have to be very, very alert to the danger is seizing ideal prematurely because it serves our own domestic concerns and so forth but will not impact the two stability. lasley of its it's extremely important to understand the taliban, particularly the omar branch of the taliban does not represent afghanistan's patch dance. they do not represent the increased population fueling the insurgency. they've capitalized on them. making a deal with the leadership will not inevitably will likely bring along with it those who are most aggrieved within supporting conflict. the notion we can wrap this up

with an agreement with mullah omar to bring peace to afghanistan i think misunderstands the situation in this country at this point. >> thank you for your comment on that. history shows, you discuss the concept of our search for al zawahiri who may abandon pakistan in me continuing to look for him to simultaneously open to the concern you have for the collaboration that appeared to be existing or at least to some extent the relationship that existed between the 10, haqqani network and some facet of pakistani leadership. now, this goes to one of the fundamental questions that we want to talk about so many various elements of what's going on there and grab, emanating from the region, but we are dealing in the aftermath of bin

laden situation and we know the tremendous commitments that have been made from the pakistanis. but you identified an issue, which has a little bit of divided loyalties. let's face it. there's an element in the room right now and it's not just soldiers on the frontline. it is a nation here in the united states victimized by terror that is similarly asking its citizens to make a substantial commitment with its young men and women on the frontlines on behalf of the countries and in addition, with its treasure. now, bin laden was in there six years before he was discovered in a think americans are asking how they could have gone undetected for that long in that kind of environment and doesn't reflect to some extent some kind of divided loyalty or complicity in some part or in both. i'm going to ask the panel to

help us resolve that issue so we can move forward to try and find some collaboration or opportunity. i'm asking to give a quick observation because my time is up. >> the answer to the question if there is a lot obviously we do not know about the physics regarding who knew what about bin laden's location. but i will say is this. pakistan clearly had an interest after 9/11 cooperating with the united states to capture and/or kill senior al qaeda leaders on its soil and there's a wealth of examples including the mastermind of the september 11 attacks of khalid sheikh mohammed in urban areas to demonstrate that. those types of arrests for killing have tailed off. i would say at the very least, whether there was complicity or

incompetence at the very least, there has not been a high priority in targeting senior al qaeda leaders in pakistan. based on that coming from this area, those interests have to change in my view. i do not believe it has been a high priority. >> thank you. i reluctantly appreciate the five-minute time limit on my ability to ask why shouldn't they know would like to have extended. the questioning throughout the entire panel, but i have to conclude right now and i turn it over to the ranking member for her questions. >> mr. chairman, thank you for your testimony. it is very troubling because on the one hand it to cure all basically saying and correct me if i am wrong, that our presence in pakistan must remain. is that true? does anyone disagree with that quite >> in some form i don't know

speaking more for myself i don't know this particular relationship in structure is the right one. but in some way we must maintain a relationship with pakistan. >> to the american people we spent over a trillion dollars in the last 10 years in iraq and afghanistan. we spent close to $20 billion in pakistan and we had to go in ourselves to take out bin laden. and i agree with the chairman, there is this elephant in the room and it comes down to trust. for all the money we've spent, how can we develop a relationship of trust that the pakistani government when in fact you have what i would call it a fairly weak president and an isi that is wrote at the very least? so i guess my question to you

is, we are here in terms of creating that trust. .. or added to the dysfunctional by having these two parallel dialogues. i think it's very critical for us to bring all these things together, and this happens so

infrequently for our leadership and icarus to pakistan or when people come from pakistan to washington that yields some benefit when we have them all in the same room together. it's very critical to talk to them together, to have them understand the facts of life, have them understand that the u.s. is not prepared to pour money down a rat hole and that given the current situation in the united states of the belt-tightening that it's not going to be possible to rely on money. >> thank you. next? >> thank you. just to echo the remarks and extended briefly i think it's also important in the interest of transparency when we had that honest dialogue first to acknowledge that at the very least both countries don't perceive themselves as having the same strategic interest. we often talk as though the u.s. and pakistan are missing page in terms of their meeting and

long-term strategic interest. and i think when that honest dialogue happens it's important to acknowledge that right now it receives its interest different than to their interests and so there's a disconnect. let me also just say that when having the debate and dialogue and discussion the interlocutors are going to be important as well. today for the short term operational reasons there has been a lot of reliance on military to military relationship in the long-term we need to be taken greater steps to build a civilian governments within pakistan and that's going to be moving away from those interlocutors even if the civilian government of pakistan is at this point quite weak ringgit would ultimately continue reliance is not going to be a recipe for long-term stability. >> thank you, dr. jones. >> one important step on the trust issue is to be honest,

both sides made a mistake the past several years. the united states publicly criticized pakistan in ways that have been unhelpful and it's conducted some operations and missions in afghanistan and pakistan without pakistan knowledge that has been unhelpful. at the same time i would say pakistan has to admit privately. i served with on the government side and the think tank's site with both the have to admit privately that it has supported some militant groups. it has to be honest and private. if it's not, there's no way to have a trusting relationship, and that honesty simply hasn't been there over the past decade. so i will say both sides at this point can say we've made mistakes but both sides also then have to admit with those mistakes are and begin to find ways to mutually address them. if we can't even be honest on the mistakes we've made we will never move forward.

>> my time is up, but maybe dr. kagen can respond. >> thank you. i think we are a long way with trust from pakistan. i think it's going to be a very long time before they trust us or we trust them given the history of our relationship. i think the suggestions made by the of the panelists are generally sound and i would second of them and only add this. there are two narratives that have persisted in south asia. one of them for a long time and the ever since my would 9/11 the decimated the trust people would have, one is we will always abandoned them and we will always at the end of the day will grow tired of the game and leave and they will be stuck with what ever is left and the river is all we care about is getting bin laden and once we get bin laden we will go and everything else is a tool to that end. and i think we stand at a very important press of this american policy right now because if we need action now that reinforce

those beliefs, first of all the repercussions will not be in pakistan they will also be felt in the countries benefiting from or going through the throes of the year in spring there will be felt around the world because they are very profound troops american foreign policy. blight even more importantly, it is cody essential that we find ways not only to communicate the frustration to pakistan which we do and we need to do but also communicate the fact we are not leaving what ever leaving means, that's not to say we will have 100,000 troops in afghanistan forever or the billions of dollars in pakistan forever but it's to say we will not whatever we do repeat the mistakes of the 1990's when we wearied a struggle or thought we had one and simply abandon the region to its feet and perino for their role until we were attacked. i think it's critical that we find ways to send the message that we are not going to do that and to show since in that region as in many other places sending messages is much less important than what you actually do.

>> i want to thank our witnesses what for your very voluble testimony. i regret it's the reality of the circumstances and the we have these other issues that have come in conflict with our schedule, and i ask the witness is to please respond to any questions and writing if in fact there should be some that would come from the members that we are not able to ask questions today. thank you for your testimony and the hearing record will remain open for ten days. without objection, the committee stands adjourned. [inaudible conversations] >> hearing in the early subcommittee members to attend a classified briefing on the death of osama bin laden.

the briefing was for all house members and afterword some spoke to reporters. their remarks are about seven minutes. it into the state department and more questions about pakistan one with one >> is there any think you learned about what they have seen her, but the intelligence have seen in the hard drives or any evidence uncovered? >> no. have they learned anything that might suspend a future attack? >> nothing was said about in the evidence they found. nothing was said about anything like that, no. still being analyzed. >> so it was marvin narrative than? >> basically a time line. >> with the pakistani military

really right there 1 mile from the compound? are you at all concerned with the billions of dollars congress appropriated and has given that they are either in at or corrupt or what do you think? >> i met with the pakistani division today and said this is a real defining moment in the relationship with pakistan. in the past while it's been a rocky relationship, we've made the decision was more positive and the relationship was pursuing. but the view of these issues of having bin laden right near the military academy in the isi headquarters living in a very upscale area with many retired military and intelligence officials it's very hard to believe that some elements of the pakistani government whether it is the military or intelligence are not aware of this. >> [inaudible] >> it's still going on coming yes. sprigg do you think [inaudible] >> this is a very important

relationship but the exchange as of sunday. so this is going to be part of the negotiations, part of the meetings between pakistani is and the administration and congress. >> you said last night [inaudible] in a way that lead and then just wondering [inaudible] do you have firsthand knowledge, not first hand what do you have knowledge? >> i've spoken to people close to the situation who said the information came from khalid sheikh mohammed after he was waterboarded directly related and that after the intervention also about libya, more information came but initial information came from khalid sheikh mohammed after waterboarding. islamic is there any clarification on osama bin laden's [inaudible] >> no. actually, i think the saying was reports of until now has been

speculation being debriefed now and no one knows what happens. >> this was on my own. >> [inaudible] >> any information of the courier, correct? >> yes, that came from myself. >> somebody who was and is very familiar with what happened at the time, yes. >> [inaudible] >> yeah, they follow as they should. i don't want a conspiracy theory starting, you know, especially the media was bad enough. to me it should be -- there's no doubt they got him so let's not

have conspiracy theories developed. from what i've heard of the pictures they are not offensive. >> why haven't the shown the briefing today? did anybody ask? >> i think it is to be decided what will happen to them. >> i don't have anything to say i just want to be photographed. [laughter] stomach about the decision to bury at sea -- >> no, there was just maybe 30 seconds or a one minute discussion on that. it was given as part of a time line. >> [inaudible] >> there's questions about what the isi -- the was brought up by the members in the questions. >> what questions did you raise in your mind? >> i've been discussing with people over the last several days as i mentioned before the pakistani people today i don't think it has been a result.

how the isi is effective intelligence agency wouldn't have seen this and actions by the isi which would compromise the highest states >> [inaudible] about how we would respond telling us what great allies they are. but back home to them the relationship exchange you can't be coming to congress asking for $2 trillion after what happens and expect to get it without serious questions being asked and the relationship being analyzed russia. >> as far as i know it is still being analyzed. >> i'm not rushing to judgment. i'm pretty willing to make a judgment that did and my question is how that will be.

>> mike rogers said he doesn't think the pakistani government had an institutional knowledge that bin laden was there. do you agree? >> i think the question is the knowledge as opposed to people operating within the government that are known by the government and allowed to flourish. >> because of the video being watched live in the white house -- >> basically showed the operation >> funding should be cut off now in pakistan? >> i think we have to begin very serious discussions and talk to the negotiations. this is important. i don't want to trivialize it at all, and we have to make a judgment as to whether it is better to pursue or not pursue. i think we have to pursue it and decide how it's going to change.

>> [inaudible] >> no. i've spoken to people who have seen them. nothing more than you expect of the first. there's nothing.

the u.s. relationship with pakistan after osama bin laden's death was the main topic at today's state department briefing. a spokesman mark acknowledges that the issue has been raised by u.s. officials including special representative markham person who's in the pakistani capital today. this is about 45 minutes. >> i polis for being late. very quickly i want to call attention to the fact that today the day when we honor all of your chosen professions, the profession of journalism, obviously it is modeled press freedom day and as the president said last week in the last month we've seen ample reminders of the important work that all of you do. we have seen journalists threatened, are arrested, beaten, attack and some cases

killed for doing the best to bring us the story to give people a voice and hold leaders accountable. the united states is proud to host this year's world press freedom the event and honor the contribution as journalists may advance the human rights and also begin we would like to congratulate the unesco prize winner rock -- who cannot and join us today because he remains in prison in iran. nonetheless he continues to demonstrate his courage. anderson he's written statement that will be read by the director general in the ceremony which commences at 3:30 p.m. at the national press club. in with that i will take questions. >> can you give some informational and disbursements's meeting in islamabad today that described their flavor on a text of what

he is they're talking about? sutphen >> he's been there since yesterday, he participated in the trilateral meeting took place in islamabad and hosted by the foreign secretary busheir and the discussed among other things the afghan lead reconciliation and a greater trade and economic integration in south asia. he also met i believe yesterday as well as today with president zardari, the prime minister as well as general chianti and general in these meetings to discuss the importance of continued cooperation in the fight against violence and extremism to continue working to the partnership in the government of pakistan to bring in better stable more prosperous pakistan. >> can you be more specific about that? not the afghan integration but we are all thrilled about and

the military people. >> don't want to get into the details of the private discussions. he did talk to the -- he did get a statement out there after the trilateral meeting in which he talked about the fact that all three countries, that they did talk about the action their resulted in death of osama bin laden and all three countries the were represented there, pakistan, the u.s. and afghanistan viewed it as a shared achievement. >> on the meetings again not the trilateral meetings but on the meetings of this individual meeting with zardari and the military guys, those were all separate or to get your? >> i believe they were all separate. >> did he express any concern or relay concerns to the pakistani officials that if this administration is not yet ready, i think it is ready and has, but people in congress and that he

was found where he was found. >> i think it's important to put his trip in the meetings in the context that these were predated in sunday night's action. spry i am well aware of that. that's not the question i was asking. islamic but this was a scheduled visit, and the thrust of the visit basically was to follow upon the diplomacy side of the secretaries society speech a couple of months ago. >> but these planned visits don't have been in a vacuum. >> understand that. the context of the visit was pretty unique. >> did he really any concerns from the administration or from the hill? i don't want to get into the substance. i would say it was a topic of discussion that the action against osama bin laden the resulted in his death was

discussed and also what was important and also stressed by the secretory yesterday multiple times was that we continue to want to work on counterterrorism with pakistan going forward. it's important as the secretary said yesterday that cooperation from sunday. >> from brinton and other officials have raised very serious questions about who and what and when they knew it about bin laden and his location. this has been more -- the talk coming from the hull from people who just eight months ago or less were all on board with kerry-lugar bill orman assistance to pakistan and seeing a completely different song right now. your policy there of the

existing policy is in serious jeopardy at least from the hill where there's going to be a significant challenge. did the ambassador grossman make it clear to the pakistanis they have to answer these questions. did he explain the consequences are not? >> i'm not going to talk that the specific conversations john brenau was very clear yesterday in saying that we are working with the government of pakistan to determine what if any support systems may have existed in place for bin laden. >> the come to the conversation between the support systems? >> i'm not going to get into the details of the conversations. we public the mccaul which we are going to raise those issues and we have indeed raised those issues into conversations with the pakistani government. that said, we also grew and the

secretary as well as the president talked about the fact that the counterterrorism cooperation helped lead us over the course of many years to something that -- >> the president spoke with john on the right after the operation. >> the sic her talk about the trust deficits and if this building has the events of last 40 hours increased the trust deficit between the united states and pakistan? >> i don't know that they've increased or decreased the trust deficit, the trust deficit in the sense of that we recognize that pakistan as the president had said and the secretary said yesterday pakistan was equally

affected by osama bin laden's campaign of terror. they've suffered grievous losses by al qaeda attacks over the years and they have been a partner with us and counterterrorism operations, and we have made progress. sunday's action in many ways was the result of some of that cooperation over the years. it's in pakistan these national interest and our interest that cooperation continue. >> you've quoted brennan at the possible support systems. what's happening in this building? what are the contacts? are there senior officials talking with officials to get to the bottom of this? >> well, again, the conversations as brennan acknowledged yesterday are ongoing. i think he said they were

understandable. i don't want to get in the details. the ambassador is on the ground. i don't want to get in the details of his conversations were but obviously the bin laden operation and killing were discussed but what was also discussed in the broad framework of our ongoing cooperation both on the counterterrorism front but also in terms of building a stronger space institutions and putting health care if these cuts pakistan on a prosperous future. sunday was a pivotal event. a great achievement. it was the result of cooperation over many years. it was a singular achievement for the armed forces and special forces. that said, we are still moving forward on behalf to help carcass and build better space

institutions and a stronger economy, and to help it, but the extremist elements in the society. >> but again, these conversations with the pakistanis, what is it -- how are they being conducted? visit the u.s. is demanding that pakistan explain what happened, how they didn't know, or what -- >> i know you cannot tell us the people, but tell us what they are looking for. >> i think we have an ongoing dialogue with them, and i think we have raised this issue. we've obviously had close contact, close cooperation with pakistan, as i said, built over many years. and we are -- we have a very candid conversations about these issues and we are discussing it with them. >> yesterday, like matt said, many lawmakers on the capitol hill from both sides of the ogle spoke about this issue. what they were saying that

pakistan let down if canada and delete what we were believed were allies and there are no water and trusted ally and that failure that even most led down. >> i don't where frankly it is dangerous to do so. clearly as john acknowledged there were questions raised about his location and we are asking that standing authorities about those questions, raising those questions with them. but beyond that, there's just circumstantial evidence and we believe that pakistan and the u.s. have a strong counterterrorism relationship and we want to continue on that

path. islamic when you conduct the most significant operation in the war on terrorism yet? you don't even tell them about it? >> the president said all along that he had actual intelligence he would act on that and the operational security -- >> the operational material around this particular operation was obviously extremely high. he called president zardari immediately after the operation and, you know, that speaks for itself. >> that's what i think speaks at hand. >> the operational security around this particular operation was the least intense. >> fair enough. deuce and you're moving forward to help the pakistanis -- has anyone been in touch with the hilly lately because it doesn't sound like -- did you listen to what happened senator kerry's hearing this morning? >> i'm very aware of the

hearings going on and that are going on this week. and we are obviously going to collaborate closely and work closely with congress going forward. >> will come is there any concern in this building that people who were fervent supporters of the kerry berman lugar or whatever it was called -- kerry-lugar bill orman are now changing -- appearing to change the mind about this? >> refers questions were raised that will be addressed in to do time. yeah. >> the other thing is the president and then the secretary again you have all said that this cooperation that pakistan has given you in the past has led to -- helped lead to bin ladens's -- what exactly was that cooperation? >> well, i'm talking -- obviously i can't talk about particular details, but there has been close cooperation that

has increased pressure on al qaeda. that is i think inarguable. that on the number of fronts with pakistan, al qaeda has been put under tremendous pressure. >> but they were specific in saying that it helped lead to bin laden's location and to where he was found hiding. that's -- that's exactly what they said and that's when you repeated. so i'm just -- i just want to know -- i mean, if they weren't told anything about this, had no idea that you had even come to hide out, this location, what exactly did they do? >> will again, matt, i don't want to get into -- >> i'm asking to prove that there is strong -- to prove your statement that there is a strong counterterrorism relationship with pakistan in a situation in which that cooperation wasn't good enough or it doesn't appear good enough that would even tell them that this was all happening. >> again, we've been very clear

from immediately after announcing this operation and its success that it was undertaken under extreme measures of operational security. we notified the pakistanis immediately afterward. and frankly, they're has been close cooperation between our intelligence agencies. i don't want to get into specifics. as brennan and others have said, this was a result of multiple threads of intelligence over many years that led to this one complicity event. and certainly, our cooperation with pakistan was an element of that culmination. >> mark, how would you rate the cooperation on other groups of interest, specifically the haqqani network, the let? are you getting similar types of cooperation from the pakistanis on those groups and do you expect them to take a different or a more aggressive line

forward? >> again, we have had good cooperation built over a number of years. this is, in many ways, a work in progress. we obviously have very -- we very much have shared goals in this. we may not always see eye to eye on how to approach a free issue, but our cooperation is ongoing, and we believe it's been effective. again, i believe it's been effected -- we believe it's been effected on putting pressure on al qaeda. and also, pakistan's military has, again, suffered a pretty substantial losses in battling extremists in waziristan and elsewhere. >> can battling the extremist elements, when was the last time the updated you on where they thought he wasn't what was their position before sunday? >> i think president zardari

talked about it in his op-ed piece today. i don't really want to get into the substance of what they may be telling us in terms of intelligence. it's not really my place and i am unable to do so. but this is the least of which someone hiding in plain sight, and as john brennan said today, it's raised questions whether he had a support network and we raised those questions with the pakistani government. >> with the lawmakers on saying today is this another thing more in the last ten years that pakistan is playing a role in the cannot be trusted and they have a revolving door you must

close and until you close the door you cannot bring -- you're making assumptions here that no one is able to make at this point. >> understand where he was found in all of the facts of the operation, and yet again, we can't draw assumptions. estimate is he denying all these years that he's not in pakistan? >> i don't think we can make any assumptions. i think we just need to talk to the pakistanis. >> on the issue of funding just for the record, there are people saying pull the plug, don't have any more funding. what is the view of the state department? who would be the effect of cutting or freezing the aid to pakistan? >> well, again, i think our view is that this has paid dividends and will continue to pay

dividends. and again, this is assistance that is in both pakistan's long-term interest as well as the united states national interests and security interests. we believe it is a vital cooperation. owsley said, we have shared goals. we are both affected by the eskridge of extremism. the vast majority of al qaeda and bin laden's victims were muslim. pakistan has suffered grievous losses from al qaeda tax. so we believe mr. this is a shared a struggling and we are continuing to work with them and we may not see eye to eye on how to approach every issue but we are going to continue to work with pakistan and we believe it is in the best interest of the nation to do so. >> are you saying that regardless of what you find out about potential support systems,

you're still going to pump aid to pakistan? >> will come again, you're trying to get me to go down a road that i don't want to go down, and i don't think i should go down, which is your, you know, he's also speculating on this. we -- it has raised questions, india, and those questions are being raised with pakistan, with pakistani authorities going forward. but at this point, we believe that our assistance is still vital. >> for did about going down the road you don't want to go down. have you told the pakistanis the problems that you, the administration is going to face on the hill in talking to get more money? or should they just know? should be self evident to them? have you said look, people are really past on the hill and they're going to -- and there are calls right now to get rid of this aid to freeze a

completely, and questions that you come in the administration are being -- are going to be forced to ask about why -- is this really worth it and are they really a true partner? so what i want to know is are you convinced that huge problem that you have right now and are going to have to the pakistanis? do they know they've got to come up with some explanations here? >> eisel presidents our nouri published an op-ed piece in the "washington post" trying to address these questions. >> so you're going to take the op-ed that he writes in "the washington post" as a response to the questions? the question is how are they fully aware? have they been -- this is why i started to come is the grossman telling the pakistanis they are in a bit of trouble here? >> i can get you more substance on what grossman's conversations have been in this, bob and i can tell you we have frank discussions with the pakistani government. obviously bin ladens's demise in

the killing has been discussed in his meetings and along with many other aspects of our bilateral relationship but of course it's self-evident that this would be a topic. >> the council is calling on the u.s. to cut aid to pakistan and others are calling him in to defend pakistan at this point, the state counter terrorists. >> i'm sorry, the last question was? >> many others are saying pakistan should be cleared in terrorism because what we found mulhern. >> again, let's not get ahead of ourselves here. what happened has raised questions. we've raised those questions with pakistani authorities. i don't want to speculate beyond

that. >> uzbeckistan sorry for what happened or are the shocked or surprised? >> again you have to ask the pakistani government. i think it's in their public statements they've called this a great achievement or something, i'm paraphrasing, but the shared achievement as well as a reflection in ambassador kriseman's statement today as well. a good thing for them i think that goes without saying. >> last night on cnn, general musharraf who was part of the ten year -- he blamed the u.s. and the cia for this drama. that's what he called it. >> i don't know what he's referring to. >> not on the state sponsored terrorism question but something that is another designation which is shortly after the war pakistan said to be cooperating with the u.s. and war on terrorism and afghanistan the former administration made pakistani what's called a major

non-nato ally which allows it to get certain materials for military equipment and special benefits. at the time to sink to the indians and particular one reason is because they were not notified was going to happen when the secretary went to islamabad and announced it. have you heard of any talk or aware of any discussion about removing pakistan from the list? anything else? >> let's continue with another problematic eight in pakistan and this one is probably a little bit more eminent. tomorrow the palestinians are supposed to sign their unity pact. understand this but delete secretary spoke yesterday to the prime minister netanyahu about the consequences of what

happened. can you tell us about the conversations and can you tell us about your discussions with lawmakers on the hill who say palestinians should get no aid if the commission to deal with hamas cracks >> i can't confirm that he did speak with the minister netanyahu and they discussed -- they didn't need to discuss the palestinian reconciliation and a related development. i don't want to get into the details of those discussions. but, i know you talked about this event and schedules for cairo tomorrow so it's also important to note that to date there is the current palestinian government remains in place and we continue to work with that government. once it is a palestinian government formed then we will accept that base. >> they see it happening

tomorrow. are you hoping if you ignore it it will go way? there must be some planning going on. islamic we are also not going to make public announcements about what may happen tomorrow. it's premature. now we are working with of the palestinian government that we believe has been effective in establishing the security institutions. >> without any change radically tomorrow? is a palestinian government with hamas playing a major role as acceptable to the united states? >> again, our long stated policy on this is that if hamas wants to play a critical role or a role in the process they should by the court principles and those have been quite clear it means to accept the principles which are renouncing violence and terrorism, recognizing the right to exist and abiding by previous diplomatic agreements. estimate how many of those to the exit and agree with right

now? >> if you have to ask them. >> the answer would be none. >> i agree. >> my question as it stands to become is the palestinian government, with hamas as a major player in it acceptable to the united states? it's not a hypothetical questions please don't out eight. as of today, a palestinian government with hamas as a major player in acceptable to the united states? >> i will say my answer would be the same which is that for hamas to play a role in the political process, it means to accept the different principles. that's very clear. once it has done that it can play a role. ek >> with the palestinians apparently fata says they don't have to do it any way. >> if and when the new palestinian government is announced they will set this composition. >> but right now you will not be able to support any palestinian government that includes hamas and the positions it stands?

>> hamas needs to abide by the court of principles in order to play a role in the political process. >> did secretary clinton touched on the aid issue at a specific way with either netanyahu or fayad? >> but she talked about that significant of the assistance package and again -- >> the legalities of it? >> lagat ortiz in terms of -- >> hamas -- >> again, i think we are waiting to see what happens. there's been an announcement. there was an announcement last week. nothing has happened so far. the composition of the palestinian government remains the same. therefore, it's important that that assistance remains in place. >> did the secretary directly talk to them about the legal issues tied with aid and the

fact that palestinians might lose it? and second, separately, is anyone from the state department or the usg or a representative on behalf of the government speaking directly to hamas about what is at stake and what they, with the u.s. thinks they should do? >> to answer the second question, i'm not aware of that. >> can you ask around? >> i'm skeptical but yes, i will last. in answer to the first question, i don't want to get into the details of the discussion. but we've been very clear that both u.s. assistance and other assistance to the palestinian authority has been important in helping them build the kind of space institutions that lead to an eventual statehood. >> do you have any, just on hamas itself, do you have any comment on the remarks by the leader of hamas about the raid that killed in london and what bin ladens -- >> if you're referring to ismail

haniya's -- well, they are outrageous. and it goes without saying bin laden was a murderer and a terrorist. he ordered the killings of those of innocent men, women and children and many of whom are muslim. he did not die in march. he died hiding in a mansion worth of how far away from the violence was carried out in his name. in his defeat is a victory for all human beings seeking to live in peace, security and dignity. so i just echo my first statement which is his remarks we find outrageous. >> but you're not prepared at this point to say that if this guy plays a major role in the new palestinian government, and that would be unacceptable? you just basically said -- >> i'm going to reiterate what i said before -- >> que said his comments were outrageous, the ridiculous, you think they might be -- for the

u.s. government to deal with the sky. >> i'm saying that there might be a way of but until the new palestinian government, if and when this is formed, will assess our policy based on that composition of the government. but until then i'm not going to speculate. >> is there a policy change in the u.s. as far as tv suffer the indians traveling on terrorist visa or student visa after that tri valley case? because now i see a lot more if the objections and the people in their crime here in the u.s. like u.s. citizens and they just want to visit them. and they're all like over 70. islamic i'm not aware that there has been any kind of new processes or requirements based on student visas. those remain the same. i think in the week of the tri valley scandal it was obviously a desire and an effort to look at some of these academic

institutions more closely and to make sure that indeed these students are not -- are not falling victims to some kind of scam. so i believe on that and on the frogs i did it. i think those have been stepped up measures to prevent that kind of event. but in terms of student visas to indian students come indian students play a vital role in our higher education system here. >> or in tourist visas like as i said that -- >> i don't -- again, i'm not aware of any changes to the tourist visas. >> can you check this and what is going on at the u.s. embassy in delhi because more and more tourists who -- >> i will reach out to the embassy and ask them, sure. >> thank you. >> yes, go ahead. >> bahrain and arrested two prominent politicians today. they continue to oppress the opposition. it seems the are not listening to your messages. >> well, you're right. in the sense that targeting

opposition politicians does undermine any attempt by the government of bahrain to engage in a national dialogue. we've said many, many times -- and i will repeat it today -- that there's no security solution to resolve the challenges that bahrain faces. we call on bahrain to respectability tammy's rise to do process in all cases in the commitment, the transparent proceedings protected the lead, conducted in full accordance with the bahrain a ball and international legal obligations. >> on bahrain do you have any comment on their trolleying physicians and nurses who treated wounded demonstrators? >> welcome again, i think it speaks to the fact that any judicial proceedings need to be done in a way that's transparent and in accordance with both bahrain law and its international obligations. and they're requires respecting detainees' rights as well as a clear explanation of the changes that they are -- that are being filed against them.

what -- so the u.s. doesn't have a standard opinion or a blanket opinion on trying -- are resting and chongging medical -- >> medical professionals? >> -- professionals who treat wounded civilians? >> i would -- again, i'm not aware of that particular story. but we would obviously be very concerned about that. >> mark, will the secretary be meeting with the bahrain officials of the libya contact group meeting, and will she be raising these issues with them? and also, could you preview that meeting at all? >> sure putative i can't answer your first question. i don't know all the details about her bilateral meetings. she certainly will have, obviously, bilateral meetings on the side of the conference itself. but if i get more information, i will let you know. but - to jake talked a little bit about the goals of rome. obviously, it's going to be a

chance to sit down with our key partners in the contact group and talk a little bit about the situation in libya and now we can take more concrete steps to help the transitional national council, as well as ways we can improve the implementation of the security council resolutions 1970 and 1973. one of the things they are talking about, obviously, is this a financial mechanism by would help get funding to the tnc. that's obviously vital. we've talked before -- i have, ambassador cretz, has talked about it. jake's talked about it -- the need that the tnc house for funding if it needs to -- so that it can survive, remain operational -- quds obviously the key element, but also other forms of nonlethal assistance, and then finally, i think trying to find -- trying to talk about

more ways to increase the diplomatic and political pressure on gadhafi and his regime. >> has turkey's erdogan briefed the secretary of his plan he's talking about to get gadhafi to go? >> i'm aware of turkish plan. i don't know if he's spoken directly to president clinton about it. but we have been clear about where we've fallen on any kind of plan which is delegitimized as a leader and should step aside and allow for a space process -- a peaceful space transition and process to take place. >> have you come up with a new protecting power in libya yet? >> my understanding is the turkish and the sea is closed in

early in the turkish diplomats remain on the ground in tripoli. we remain in contact with them. >> so there's no noel kinsella, they remain our protecting power in tripoli. again, really the turkish government is obviously best informed by this. but my understanding is that there were some security concerns that led them to temporarily close their mission but that they remain there. >> right after the close the mission everyone cannot and said gadhafi has to go which reminds me kind of the way that you closed down your embassy and then came out -- >> what i will say is turkey remains -- i will reiterate turkey remains our protecting power in libya. >> speaking of legitimate leaders who lose or don't lose their legitimacy, has asad gone too far in your eyes or has he still been okay? [laughter] >> still trying to grab your question. i mean, obviously, we are very

disturbed about recent reports, credible reports that -- of a syrian military operation in daraa that includes the use of tanks. we've also seen reports that the syrian government is conducting a widespread campaign of arbitrary arrests the target young men in daraa. it's also our understanding that electricity, communications and other services, public services, have been cut off now for many days and the humanitarian situation is quite grave. these are quite frankly barbaro treasures and the amount to the collective punishment of innocent civilians. >> and that's still of enough for you to question his legitimacy as a leader? >> again, we have -- he needs to cease all violence. his government needs to cease violence against innocent protestors. we need to -- or he needs to answer the legitimate

aspirations of his people. he needs to address their concerns and to seek ways to answer their aspirations. violence is not the answer. >> well, yeah, but -- well, you just accused of some of barbarism. >> yes. his -- >> which on the -- that spinning wheel of the state department condemnation is pretty strong. [laughter] it's reserved for people like gadhafi and robert mugabe, media. >> and we've taken steps last week. we've instituted sanctions against key members of his regime who have been carrying out some of these actions. we also raised the issue of human rights abuses and syria at the human rights council, which then, in turn, authorized a fact-finding mission to investigate these human rights abuses with the goal that serious -- that asad will be held accountable for his actions.

>> the french president said today in an interview that he's considering putting sanctions against the president -- asad himself to read is the u.s. considering such actions? >> , i would just say many options remain before us. we obviously took action last week on people -- individuals we believed were the key actors in carrying out some of the regime's policies and actions against protesters. but other options remain on the table. >> well, when you say that asad should be held accountable for his actions, how? >> well, again, there are mechanisms in place. there are -- let's let this fact-finding -- >> in the courts or -- >> let's with this fact-finding mission take place. but the united nations human rights council has spoken out strongly about the syrian government's abuses. >> you'd like to see a referral to the icc?

>> again, i just noel kinsella or perhaps the creation of a special tribunal? given serious's -- >> let's let the process play out. >> given serious's warm embrace of the last special tribunal that the u.n. convened for a situation in that neck of the woods, would you expect that there would be any support from it from syria itself? >> again, let's let the process play out. >> mark? >> yes. >> just one quick question on osama bin laden. when those helicopters went into pakistan, was that a violation of their airspace? >> that's a fair question, jill, and i will take it. i'm not sure. again, there was a decision made here to back on operational intelligence or actionable intelligence, rather, and to -- basically to get one of the -- well, not one of -- the most wanted man in the world, and that was undertaken. i'm not sure that it was a

violation of their airspace. obviously, there was -- there were some pakistani jets that were scrambled, but i'm not aware that it was a violation of their airspace. estimate is that something you could pin down? is that something you decide or define? >> it may very well be the pakistani government has the best information about that. but i could certainly ask. >> is it your understanding that the pakistanis regarded bin laden as the number one -- would you just -- regarded him as the number one most wanted terrorist alive? >> i think if you asked people around the world to the most wanted man alive was, they would probably have said bin laden. >> but you believe that was the position of the pakistani government of sunday afternoon? >> we believe that he was a brutal killer -- >> but what do you think -- >> -- not only to the -- not only for americans but many of your nationalities around the world including pakistan.

>> is it your understanding that that's what the pakistani government believe as well? >> i have no idea what they're most wanted list looks like. >> the would seem to be a bit of a problem if you have such strong counterterrorism cooperation if you're not sure they shared four -- >> he was clearly a killer whose death lives to the police with pakistan and the united states on more secure footing. >> can i just ask one more question about bahrain? >> yeah. >> they have done things that you've criticized other countries were doing. has the u.s. done anything beyond verbally criticize them? have you raised the prospect for sanctions or -- >> will again, i didn't mean to cut you off but assistant secretary feltman's made several trips out there and -- >> i know. but, i mean, beyond saying we don't like what you're doing, have you taken any action?

have i missed something i'm wondering why? >> i mean, look, i mean, it's important that our assistance secretary has spent a significant amount of time out there trying to work with both the government and the opposition to bridge some of these gaps, but also to make very clear to the government that there's no -- as we have said multiple times, there's no security solution to this and that the need to take steps to address the legitimate concerns of their people. >> okay. >> that's it? thanks. >> thank you. ..